47 Terry M. Moe – William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J. L. Econ. Org. 132, 163 (describes how simply designating an “executive agreement” instead of “treaty” would allow the President to implement a foreign policy without involving the Senate); See also Matthew A. Crenson – Benjamin Ginsberg, Presidential Power: Unchecked and Unbalanced 321 (2007) (on the grounds that Franklin D. Roosevelt`s use of the executive agreement was motivated by a desire to circumvent the Senate). 60 See Infra, Table 3, which shows the share of agreements concluded in the form of contracts for a number of different countries.
A full list of countries is also available in Table 2 of the online schedule. Survival time analysis offers different models for estimating the longevity of an observed subject, each of which has advantages and disadvantages. The choice of model depends primarily on the discretion of the survival times of the subjects analyzed, so that they can be counted, or continuously, as well as how they are observed. As a result, the United States has effectively converted to an administrative regime for drafting international agreements, but it has not yet put in place an adequate system of control and accountability to comply with that regime. [Note 404] Id., 694. See also Ladies – Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), in which the Court supported a series of enforcement actions taken by the President as part of executive agreements with Iran to resolve the hostage crisis. The court found that Congress had given the president certain economic powers underpinning the agreements, and that his suspension of rights had been implicitly ratified over time by Congress`s failure to nullify the alleged power.
See also Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29-30 n. 6 (1982). The first opportunity to opt out is the fact that non-autonomous contracts follow a two-step process to become applicable under U.S. law. Footnote 39 After ratification, non-autonomous treaties require additional implementation through legislation that requires a simple majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Compare this with the executive agreement, for which the terms of application can and will be adopted at the same pace as ratification. Hathaway argues that the two-step treaty process allows the president to break his promise after ratification, either intentionally or because the domestic policy costs for implementing enforcement laws are too high. Footnote 40 At the same time, anecdotal evidence also provides alternative explanations for plausibility.